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value against Soviet employment of an aggressive foreign policy. Consequently, Lockwood calls these statements declaratory deterrence. As a check to verify the real Soviet view of given U.S. doctrine, Soviet foreign policy behavior is compared to their analysis of the U.S. doctrine. By using a wide variety of sources including journals whose articles have price approval of the C.P.S.U. and the formerly classified Soviet general staff publication, Military Thought, Lockwood enables the reader to view U.S. strategic doctrine through Soviet eyes.

Three themes emerge from the book. The first is that Soviet strategic planners view U.S. doctrine within the framework of their own strategic doctrine. This mirror imaging was particularly evident in the Soviet reaction to McNamara's assured destruction doctrine. Although this was an arms control strategy designed to provide a minimal nuclear capacity to inflict unacceptable damage following a Soviet surprise attack, the Soviets believed it to be a nuclear warfighting doctrine because all of their doctrines were designed to win a nuclear war. The Soviets similarly misinterpreted Nixon's policy of realistic deterrence. Lockwood also notes that the Soviets tend to view purely academic discussions of strategic doctrine as having the imprimatur of the government because all Soviet writings are approved by the government.

Even though the Soviets ultimately recognized that the U.S was indeed moving toward a deterrence policy, the Kremlin was puzzled because according to Marxist-Leninist theory, imperialist America is inherently aggressive. The Soviets resolved this contradiction by concluding that the change in U.S doctrine from a nuclear warfighting strategy was in response to the rapid growth in Soviet strategic power. This was particularly evident in the Soviet reaction to realistic deterrence and the abandonment of McNamara's flexible response in favor of assured destruction. Lockwood clearly states that if the Soviets perceive us as abandoning a nuclear warfighting doctrine because of the buildup in Soviet arms, then the incentive is for them to extract further concessions by building more arms than negotiating arms limitation.

Finally, Lockwood concludes that the Soviets treat U.S. strategic doctrine seriously only if we have sufficient military capabilities to match our strategic pronouncements. The initial Soviet reaction to Schlesinger's limited nuclear option policy of increased targeting flexibility was one of concern inasmuch as the Soviets perceived us as moving from a deterrence to nuclear warfighting strategy which included a possible premptive strike. When, however, we neither developed an antiballistic missile system nor increased our civil defense posture to meet the requirements of a limited nuclear option strategy, the doctrine was quickly discredited. Accordingly, Lockwood recommends that the United States emphasize these two neglected areas in future strategic doctrine.

This thought provoking and timely book is a must for all those concerned with U.S. strategic planning. One hopes that Lockwood will similarly analyze the Soviet response to strategic developments during the Reagan administration.

1st Lt. Jay L. Spiegel 331st Mt Company, 97th USARCOM Fort Meade, Md.

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Psychic Warfare: Threat or Illusion? by Martin Ebon, McGraw-Hill, New York, 282 pages, \$15.95.

Psychic Wariare poses the strong possibility that some type of future warfare may include an Orwellian component. This does not mean that psychic warfare by itself will supplant the more traditional modes of war and the book's context tends to support this slant.

The book addresses the possible link between psychic phenomena, extrasensory perception, and mind control experiments with the future prospect of military application. There is strong ovidence in Ebon's book that the military, scientific and intelligence communities of both the United States and the Soviet Union have and are making zealous attempts to harness the power and potential of the mind to do things such as move objects, to perceive events that have not yet occurred, and to span time, distance and space across all ideological and political boundaries. There have been attempts by U.S. and Soviet scientists, plus scientists from nonaligned nations, to "pool" the results of past psychic experiments. Ebon's book states that the Soviets are playing down their interest in psychic applications, but in reality are mounting a large effort to gain supremacy in this relatively new scien-

The author's basic premise is that all persons are endowed with extrasensory ability, but do not consciously apply it in their daily lives. There are, however, a relatively small number of persons that are keenly aware of their psychic gifts that, under controlled scientific conditions, appear to experience visual and sensory perceptions "normal" people have not been able to experience. The author contends that "normal" persons have similar psychic experiences on occasion without being able to explain the "occurrence."

Mind altering, psychotronics and extrasensory perception can be frightening when further explored. Ebon illustrates this by explaining a case in which the CIA conducted, experiments using persons with keen psychic gifts to contact agents that had died while on operational missions (CIA spy Oleg Penkovsy, for one). The agency's justification for the experiments was "to determine the circumstances of apprehension, methods of interrogation, and the degree of information disclosed during interrogation(s)."

The military communities of both superpowers are aware of the possibilities in the areas of Intelligence and communications that psychic warfare could afford them, some which could enable them to "see" and "hear" into enemy territory without actually having to send an operational asset across national boundaries.

The ultimate use of psychic power would be projection of mind power to a specific location, say 2 Dzerzinksy Square, the KGB headquarters in Moscow, and actually "picking up" information without the KGB knowing what is happening. Of course, the situation could be reversed.


It all comes down to which nation wants it enough to commit the money and scientific resources required. If successful psychic warfare does occur in the near future, it would mean that the nation using it first would have the potential of keeping it secret from the rest of the world for an undeterminable period. Once the secret is out, however, there would be no telling what impact it would have on our planet's power

centers, and worse, how would further development and use be controlled. Some means would have to be found to curtail proliferation of this new "weapon."


After reading this exciting book, I came away with the impression that **Psychic Warfare** is an addition to the "Star Wars" package primarily because of the vast possibilities in collecting military information through mind power. As time goes on, new military uses should not be discounted if a nation is willing to invest a substantial part of its military, industrial and scientific resources toward achieving it.

Michael S. Evancevich U.S. Army, Retired





Grossword solution



Military Intelligence

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